Category: Politics

  • Ethnography and Institutions for Development Policy

    Chris Blattman recently posted a powerful argument that as development policy, skills training is a bad investment. There is just very little evidence that it is effective.

    From 2002 to 2012 the World Bank and its client governments invested $9 billion dollars across 93 skills training programs for the poor and unemployed. In lay terms, that is a hundred freaking million dollars per program.

    Unfortunately, these skills probably did very little to create jobs or reduce poverty.

    Virtually every program evaluation tells us the same thing: training only sometimes has a positive impact. Almost never for men. And the programs are so expensive—often $1000 or $2000 per person—that it’s hard to find one that passes a simple cost-benefit test.

    In a much longer discussion paper, he and Laura Ralston call for more research, and for a greater focus on capital-based programs and the potential for complementarities with skill-based problems. In short, rather than train people to do something, either give them money to buy something, or build them something yourself. And then maybe see if skills training them helps even more.

    Like any good paper by any self-respecting social scientist, one of their main recommendations is for more research that they and their students do. More evidence, more micro-pilots, more multi-country interventions to learn about context. I agree. But in the spirit of Chris’s invitation for “discussion, and comments and criticisms” let me suggest a role for more ethnography and more institutional analysis.

    It always strikes me how different the view of (say) the World Bank is from that of the local entrepreneur, laborer, or mother who works at home. My immediate thought when I hear that any individually-targeted development intervention has failed is “well, could it have succeeded?” In other words, does the intervention manipulate a binding constraint for an individual or household? The point is not that I’m sure that all interventions fail to do so, but rather that I rarely have good reason to suspect that they will. The suggestion that follows is to learn more about how individuals and households make decisions in the local contexts in which they live their everyday lives. Find out what those constraints are, and then try to push on those. The people who know how to learn about those everyday constraints are trained in ethnography—and I mean serious ethnography, the kind that involves languages and staying outside of a hotel.

    A focus on institutions implies a different direction. Everyone agrees that institutions are important, but the cutting edge in development economics and related parts of political science focuses elsewhere. Why? Because institutions aren’t manipulable, their features bundle lots of treatments, core concepts remain tremendously fuzzy (try defining governance, for example), we don’t seem to have learned a lot from decades of studying them, and the potential for disaster from bad institutional design is just enormous. Yes. But I don’t see a way around taking formal and informal institutions seriously in development policy. It is not true that variation in development outcomes is purely a function of individual characteristics aggregated to the region or country. Context is not reducible to individuals, and institutions are part of that context. Learn about these institutions, both formal structures and informal practices and conventions, even if they aren’t manipulable. Even descriptive knowledge about institutions can be immensely valuable.

    So that’s my suggestion. Want to design better policy? Think both smaller and bigger. Understand local constraints (small) and institutions (big). Both of these things imply that there is knowledge out there that is useful, yet non-experimental in nature. By implication, effectiveness of interventions depends on factors that cannot be manipulated as part of an intervention’s design, but which should guide implementation and cost-benefit calculations anyway. I find it hard believe that anyone would disagree with these ideas—to me, my comments in this post are almost platitudes, they are so mild—but it is still worth saying them explicitly.

  • Malaysia’s Opposition Coalition Is Dead

    Seven years after it was formed, Malaysia’s most successful three-party opposition coalition, the Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Pact), is officially dead. This is a blow for the many Malaysians who support an alternative to the Barisan Nasional regime that has ruled Malaysia in one form or another since 1957.

    The final blow came from Democratic Action Party Secretary General Lim Guan Eng, who announced two days ago that the PR “ceased to exist.” The proximate cause of that, in turn, was a recent decision by the general assembly (muktamar) of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) to stop collaborating with DAP. This followed what Bridget Welsh has called a “purge of the progressives” during the muktamar, in which conservatives from the “ulama wing” grabbed all of the party’s important leadership posts.

    Those final details are important, but the roots of the PAS-DAP split are structural in nature. PAS is an Islamic party, overwhelmingly supported by ethnic Malays. DAP is a social democratic party, overwhelmingly supported by ethnic Chinese. As I wrote in 2007,

    in many ways, each opposition party has more in common with the BN than it does with other opposition parties.

    And in 2013, after the results of the 2013 General Election came in and remarking upon Anwar Ibrahim promise to step down, I observed that

    Without the pluralist PKR and Anwar’s dynamic leadership, it is unclear how a largely Chinese social democratic party and an Islamist party can remain in the same coalition.

    Back in 2007, writing in the wake of the split of the Barisan Alternatif, I was skeptical about the possibility of cross-ethnic cooperation in the near future. That was wrong: cooperation did work from 2008 until 2015, and generated a majority of votes going to PR instead of the BN in 2013. We now face the possibility that PAS will cooperate more formally with UMNO and the BN. Such cooperation would align Islamic and Malay-nationalist agendas (which have quite a bit in common anyway) while further sidelining non-Malay and non-Muslim voices in this diverse multiethnic and multireligious country. This makes sense from UMNO’s perspective given that UMNO now dominates the BN to an unprecedented extent, and no longer has a parliamentary supermajority.

    So what’s next? From my vantage point in Ithaca it is hard for me to say, but there are four important places now to watch.

    First, Persatuan Ummah Sejahtera Malaysia (PasMa), which translates to something like the “Union of the Faithful for a Prosperous Malaysia.” PasMa describes itself as a “watchdog” group to ensure that PAS does not cooperate with the BN, and represents (after a fashion) those progressives who have been purged from PAS. And its chief Datuk Phahrolrazi Zawawi is now calling for a new Islamic party to participate in a new opposition coalition. Can PasMa be that party? Only time will tell.

    Second, PKR, the People’s Justice Party. Its stance is firming up as I write this: just a couple hours ago PKR echoed Lim Guan Eng in declaring PR dead. Quo vadis PKR? It is not yet clear.

    Third, the BN’s component parties. If PAS moves to cooperate more formally with UMNO, then UMNO and the non-Malay parties face an interesting choice. The Non-Malay parties will almost certainly resist bringing PAS into the coalition, for that dilutes their voice even further and threatens their core interests as well. Yet I would not rule out a formal alliance between UMNO and PAS in the near future, even if the non-Malay parties quit in protest. If so—and believe me this is a hypothetical—this would signify the most significant party system change in Malaysian history.

    And fourth, state-level PR governments. Yes, the PR is dead, but PR-based coalitions still rule in important states such as Selangor, Penang, and Kelantan. Selangor is the critical case: here, unlike in Penang or Kelantan, PAS must remain in alliance with PKR and DAP for the government to stay together. Will it? Selangor is a relatively prosperous, multiethnic, “suburban” state near Kuala Lumpur, not a rural northern Malay heartland state. It is also the site of the infamous Selangor crisis. PAS members there almost certainly differ from party members in the Malay heartland. This may be where to look to see where Malaysian party politics is heading. Selangor Backbenchers Club chairman Ng Suee Lim recently said that the government would remain in power so long as the three parties

    could still agree on certain common issues and be respectful to each other

    We will have to see if that will be possible.