Category: Current Affairs

  • The Chinese Growth Differential

    This months dramatic volatility in the Chinese stock market has raised the question once more about after twenty years of breakneck economic growth, China’s growth trajectory is sustainable. Many consider a correction of some sort to be inevitable (see for example Brad Delong here). One strategy to look for signs that this is happening is to look at various indicators of economic activity within China, as James Hamilton has done. It is also useful, though, to step back a bit to see what we think Chinese growth ought to look like given what we know about economic growth in the rest of the world.

    I’ve done this by creating an empirical model of economic growth for all countries except for China. The model looks like this:

    gyt-t0 = yit0 + Xit + Dt + Dr

    where gyt-t0 is annual (geometric) growth in real GDP per capita over a five year period, yit0 is the initial level of real GDP per capita for that five year period, and Xit are the five-year averages of the other determinants of economic growth. Dt and Dr are period and region fixed effects, respectively. I’ve done this two ways, both including and excluding time and region effects. Naturally, country fixed effects would be nice, but including them effectively precludes me from being able to predict how Chinese growth might differ from growth elsewhere. So to be clear, any distinctive “Chinese” growth effect is captured in the “East Asia” dummy.

    These are what I’d call “appropriately naive Barro regressions.” They follow in the spirit of Barro’s classic Determinants of Economic Growth in modeling economic growth as a function of initial per capita GDP in levels plus measures of human capital, government policy, macroeconomic conditions, and regime type. They differ in that they do not even attempt to untangle issues of causality. No three-stage least squares using lags, colonial history, and regional dummies as instruments, or anything of the sort. Hence these regressions are “naive,” but that is “appropriate.”

    Using data from the World Development Indicators augmented by some additional variables from the QoG dataset, I estimated the two models described above for all countries in the world except for China. I then predicted what Chinese growth would look like using actual data from China. This gives us yearly predictions: in any year, given China’s level of per capita GDP and other variables, what is our best guess about its rate of growth in that year?

    I have plotted the resulting predictions here. The black series is the prediction that includes region and time effects, and the blue series ignores these. The red solid line is China’s actual economic growth.
    growth
    As you can see, since 1991 China has grown far faster than the appropriately naive model predicts. What is also true, though, is that the differences between China’s predicted and actual growth rates are narrowing considerably since 2011. This might be interpreted as a reversion to the “predicted” growth path based on the cross-national experience of the past forty years. What we observe, then, is a “Chinese growth differential.”
    differential
    That differential was lower in 2014 than it had been since the aftermath of Tiananmen.

    There are some other interesting things to note. The standard neoclassical growth model predicts convergence, in which countries growth rates slow as their GDPs rise. As Barro showed, the data do not support this simple story; they instead support a story of conditional convergence in which countries growth rates slow conditional on macroeconomic and political conditions (although see Rodrik recently and Quah not-so-recently for other views). The blue and black lines in the first graph above show a gentle increase in predicted growth rates. One interpretation of this is that, in a conditional convergence world, changes in living standards in China have actually outpacing the increases in GDP as determinants of economic growth. A wealthier China in 2010 should grow faster than China of 1990 due to the rapid increases in health and education.

    What does this mean? Recall that this prediction model cannot account for anything particular to China. So as a result it cannot tell us if any such Chinese particularity is durable or not, or if recent growth has been atypical relative to what China’s growth should be like. The estimated differential is relative to a counterfactual of all other countries’ growth experiences, not relative to some counterfactual version of China.

    But if we hold that caveat aside, as well as the problems of causal identification in naive (but appropriate!) growth regressions, it confirms that slower Chinese growth is to be expected. The interesting part is how this interacts with current events, in particular China’s stock market crisis and its political fallout. None of the above predictions suggests that a stock collapse is inevitable, but such a collapse might indeed hasten the shift toward to a more modest growth path. Check back in six months to see if that is the understatement of the year.

    NOTES

    For R code to produce these graphs, please see the first comment. Here are the full model results for Model 1 and Model 2.

    Dependent variable:
    growth
    (1) (2)
    log(GDPPC.Initial) -0.520*** -0.702***
    (0.093) (0.121)
    Fixed Capital Formation 0.154*** 0.153***
    (0.010) (0.010)
    Gov Final Cons Exp -0.060*** -0.055***
    (0.012) (0.011)
    Trade/GDP 0.008*** 0.011***
    (0.002) (0.002)
    Inflation -0.003*** -0.003***
    (0.0003) (0.0003)
    Life Expectancy 0.036** 0.036*
    (0.017) (0.021)
    Secondary Enrollment Rate 0.005 0.003
    (0.005) (0.006)
    Polity2 Score 0.043*** 0.044***
    (0.015) (0.017)
    Constant -0.054 3.199**
    (0.863) (1.244)
    Observations 867 867
    R2 0.377 0.454
    Adjusted R2 0.372 0.438
    Residual Std. Error 2.447 (df = 858) 2.314 (df = 841)
    F Statistic 65.009*** (df = 8; 858) 27.992*** (df = 25; 841)
    Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
  • Politics as Usual under Najib

    The Malaysian Insider has published an interesting new essay by Danny Quah on the Najib Razak and Malaysia’s current political climate.

    In 1971, more than forty years before the world would turn its attention to the top 1% and the problem of income inequality, Malaysia embarked on one of history’s boldest and most noble of experiments to reduce social disparity. Malaysia’s New Economic Policy or NEP would seek to “eradicate poverty for all” and “eliminate identification of race by economic function and geographic location”….Malaysia was a democracy that hewed the rule of law…Its income is now well above world emerging-economy average, and its urban infrastructure and worker skills approach those in the first world. Malaysia’s top bankers, business people, and entrepreneurs are admired everywhere. NEP reduced pockets of extreme poverty and created a significant, thriving, and successful Bumiputera middle class…And, although from time to time patchily diverging from the ideal, throughout this history Malaysia worked hard to maintain its young democracy and its adherence to rule of law, and to support a healthy vigorous open sphere of public debate….All this is now at risk…Significant Bumiputera and rural poverty remain. Ever more frequent accounts have appeared of government agencies intended to reduce Bumiputera poverty only enriching the elites of that group….The practice continues to worsen in Malaysia of elites undermining good intentions and exploiting for self interest the very instruments designed to help others. And it’s doing so more and more sharply.

    The essay is interesting to me primarily because it suggests that problems such as corruption, exploitation of the poor, the Islamization of the Malay identity, repression of dissent and journalistic criticism—that they are somehow new developments in Malaysian politics and society.

    My read is different. These are current problems, yes, but they were woven into the very fiber of Malaysia’s post-1971 political order. Their antecedents are everywhere—Ops Mayang, anyone? EPF scandal?—if you care to look. They define much of what makes Malaysia’s political economy so interesting, and its regime such an exemplar of the authoritarian part of competitive authoritarianism.