Category: Asia

  • Why Aren’t There More Exclusionary Populists in Asia?

    We live in the age of populism, and its global spread has produced a wealth of research and commentary. We now know more about what populism is and how it varies than we did two decades ago, and this emerging body of research is truly global in scope, putting comparativists in conversation with Americanists, theorists, and historians.

    One question that has long interested me is this: why don’t we see more European-style anti-immigrant populists in East and Southeast Asia? Specifically, why is exclusionary populism so rare in East and Southeast Asia, and inclusionary populism the dominant mode of populist mobilization? The answer cannot be “because there are no migrant minorities to target,” because there are; it also cannot be “because there is no ethnic or religious conflict, chauvinism, or bigotry,” because there is. In a new essay, I develop an answer to this question that focuses on the timing and sequence of the emergence of mass politics and the stickiness of the concepts of national peoplehood that followed. Here is the abstract.

    Populists in East and Southeast Asia generally refrain from invoking anti-migrant and anti-minority sentiments as part of their mobilizational strategies. This differentiates them from “exclusionary” populists in Europe and the United States, even though many Asian countries are diverse societies with long histories of migration and ethnic chauvinism. In this essay I propose that Asian populists work within rather than against existing categories of peoplehood that were set alongside the onset of mass politics. Because these categories of peoplehood remain salient today, they constrain contemporary Asian populists’ rhetorical and mobilizational strategies. Exceptional cases such as the Rohingya and Chinese Indonesians, who are vulnerable to populist mobilization, provide further support for this argument about how contested notions of peoplehood make exclusionary populism possible. The Asian experience thus reveals the flexibility of identity, nation, and membership in contemporary populism.

    If you’re reading this and saying “hey wait, what about…?” let me emphasize that I agree that there are exceptions. Those exceptions—instances where we do see exclusionary populism in Asia—-are actually useful evidence that is consistent with my argument about timing, sequence, and membership.

  • Lee Hsien Loong and Mahathir Mohamad on “Fake News” Bills

    In an era of “fake news” and social media replacing the conventional media, many countries have begun to pass laws designed to clamp down on the spread of misinformation via the internet. Southeast Asia is no exception: Malaysia passed an Anti-Fake News Act in 2018 (PDF), for example. Currently, Singapore is entertaining a draft anti-fake news bill called the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (PDF).

    Singaporean civil society has widely criticized POFMA, arguing that it will clearly have negative consequences for the freedom of expression and criticism, especially among academics (see e.g. here and here) but also more broadly across society (see e.g. here).

    It is in this context that I stumbled across the following clip of a press conference between Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Mahathir was recently elected Prime Minister in a stunning defeat of the Barisan Nasional government—he, in fact, was the first person charged under Malaysia’s anti-Fake News Act back in 2018. One of his coalition’s main campaign promises was to repeal that country’s anti-Fake News Act.

    The clip features PM Lee defending POFMA, and then Mahathir explaining why his government repealed Malaysia’s fake news act.* For anyone who has watched Malaysian politics over the years, seeing Mahathir criticize government overreach—and alleging that governments will now be the ones making fake news—is a sight to behold.

    Singapore and Malaysia are neighbors with close ties and a linked history, and until 2018 both had been led by strong electoral authoritarian regimes. PM Lee’s and PM Mahathir’s commentaries on government efforts to clamp down on fake news are a good summary of how things have changed in Malaysia,** and how they have not in Singapore.

    NOTES

    * They are also gently insulting one another, in ways that Singaporeans and Malaysians often do.
    ** I do not mean to exaggerate, of course. New parties in government do not necessarily mean new politics or new policies, especially without new politicians.