Tom Pepinsky

Category: Asia

  • Democratic Disappointments, Authoritarian Reformists, and Political Equilibria

    My old friend and colleague Kevin Fogg recently mused about how many pro-democracy figures in Southeast Asia have proven to be disappointing in office, whereas so many anti-democratic figures are proving to be very important for liberalizing movements in the region. Think of Mahathir Mohamad—Malaysia’s long time authoritarian ruler—now advocating for political liberalization; think of Aung San Suu Kyi—Nobel Peace Laureate and former political prisoner—who remains silent on issues of grave import in Burma.

    His post asks some interesting questions, but I think it reflects a common belief that the views of individual elites are central to understanding the essence of a country’s politics. There are lots of people who demand reform and openness in Malaysia, but when Mahathir does, this clearly changes the game. This belief in turn draws on a common view that the problem of political reform is getting the right people with the right beliefs in office. That is why it is so disappointing when someone like Aung San Suu Kyi fails to live up to her reputation once in office, and why it is so important for so many to ask whether Mahathir has “really” had a change of heart.

    From my perspective, though, it is useful to remember decades of research in comparative politics has argued that the character of a political regime is not a function of the views of its elites. There is no consensus that mass democratic values cause democracy (although the literature examining this proposition continues to develop), and there is hardly any rigorous evidence that democracy emerges because liberals or democrats come to power. My own preferred interpretation, one widely shared in the literature since O’Donnell and Schmitter, is that democracy is an equilibrium, the outcome of struggles among individuals and factions, none of whom may actually value democracy but who may nevertheless find themselves overseeing a democratic regime because no one faction can defeat all others (one such account, by Przeworski, is here).

    Under such a perspective, it might be nice to know if Mahathir has had a change of heart, but it does not actually matter. He may drag Malaysia towards a more open politics because he favors openness, or because he detests Najib this is the only way to unseat him, or for any other reason. Likewise, Aung San Suu Kyi may have benefited from a moment of openness in the late 2000s, but the course of political change in Burma must not be reduced to her own voice. Much like oligarchy is not the politics of oligarchs, democracy is not rule by democrats. Keeping this in mind may indeed give those who favor greater political openness in Burma, Malaysia, and beyond cause for optimism.

  • Siam or Thailand? The Pattani Malay Case

    Via New Mandala, I came across this interesting video, a statement by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Movement) that claims to represent the Pattani Malay nation of southern Thailand.

    The language is a fairly formal version of Bahasa Melayu, the national language of Malaysia.* I was interested to hear the speaker refer to not Thai colonialism, but rather “Siamese colonialism” [= kolonisasi oleh Siam]. Elsewhere we hear Thailand as negara Siam, and several other such constructions.

    I wonder if this use of Siam instead of Thailand is politically meaningful. In Malay, as in English and in Thai itself, the word Siam is not proper. Instead, one would say negara Thai [= State of Thailand] or kerajaan Thai [= Kingdom of Thailand]—or, as the Bahasa Melayu wikipedia page does it, just Thailand. The word Siam was used by the Thai monarchy prior to 1949, but it is an exonym. According to Preecha Juntanamalaga’s very interesting article “Thai or Siam?” published in the journal Names: A Journal of Onomastics**,

    Clearly, then, Siam is a loanword into Thai, where it is treated as a”foreign” element following Pali-Sanskrit word order in compounds. Thai, on the other hand, is an original word and used according to the normal syntax of the language.

    For centuries, the distinction between the two terms was clear.

    The Thai people continued to refer to themselves as Thai and to their realm as Mu’ang Thai, Krong Thai, and Krong Sri Ayudhya. Foreign traders, on the other hand, consistently referred to the realm as Siam or a variant.

    Only in the 1800s did the kingdom come to refer to itself as Siam. Specifically, under the modernizing King Mongkut:

    the King required new standards and forms of dress for those in his presence; similarly, the “civilized nation” required a “proper” name.

    Put otherwise, the idea is that Mongkut wished to portray himself as equal to the European powers of the time. Doing so could have been facilitated by adopting the name that the European powers themselves used to describe his realm.

    The article also discusses when and why the switch from Siam to Thailand took place. That discussion touches on domestic political conflict after the fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932, as well as the WWII alliance with Japan and its subsequent disavowal. There is also a section on why some scholars today prefer Siam, with some considering Thailand a “mongrelization.” The politics of language indeed!

    So to return to the Pattani Malay conflict, what’s going on with naming Thailand “Siam?” My guess is that it recalls the colonial empire that called itself Siam, the successor of which BRN believes still is colonizing Pattani. It could also be that they consider this term to be an insult. It could also be that they reject the idea that they live in a country called Thailand, because reject the assumption that they are Thai.

    Perhaps a scholar of Thailand could enlighten me in further.

    NOTES

    * It is very clearly not the local Pattani variant of Malay. I can only barely understand that dialect, and my understanding is imperfect even under the best circumstances.
    ** Yes, such a journal exists.