Author: tompepinsky

  • Will Severe COVID-19 Outbreaks Erase Partisan Differences?

    A number of recent essays have noted just how divided the American experience with COVID-19 is—by geography, by state, and (as my coauthors Shana Gadarian and Sara Goodman have argued) by partisanship. As America starts to open up again, it is doing so unevenly, creating what Ed Yong recently called a “patchwork pandemic.”

    Although my coauthors and I have emphasized partisan differences, and taken special care to ensure that what we identify as partisan differences aren’t just geographic or other kinds of differences that happen to be correlated with partisanship, COVID-19 itself has been experienced very differently across parts of the country. In places like New York City, where the outbreak has been so severe, we might not find partisan differences at all because the objective facts of the crisis are so plain for all to see. It is reasonable to ask if these partisan differences that we’ve uncovered are just temporary or incidental due to the spatial unevenness of the COVID-19 outbreak.

    It could be, then, that if we see more localized outbreaks of COVID-19 around the rest of the country, partisan differences in health behavior will disappear there too.

    To check if this is plausible, we investigate below six health behaviors where we observed strong partisan difference in late April/early May: wearing a mask, self-quarantining, avoiding gatherings or contact with others, washing hands, and purchasing hand sanitizer. We use logistic regression to estimate the probability that someone reports doing each of those things, controlling for basic demographic facts as well as a demanding set of state-by-urban/rural fixed effects. This means that we are comparing, in essence, people at the same level of urban versus rural in the same state, so we don’t assume that the effect of being in a rural area is the same in, say, New York versus Wyoming.* Importantly, we also allow the effect of partisanship to vary by the county-level COVID-19 diagnosis rate as of May 1 (right near the end of our survey). And we find this:

    Partisan differences are statistically significant no matter how severe the outbreak of COVID-19 is… just until it is the most severe. Then, above the 90th percentile or so of COVID-19 severity, partisan differences disappear.

    These results don’t tell us what will happen if places that have heretofore been spared from a severe outbreak find themselves beset by a rash of new diagnoses.** But they do say that when the outbreak is really bad, partisanship no longer predicts health behavior. It is left as an exercise for the reader to decide if that’s a good thing or a bad thing.

    In fact, probably a more interesting thing to observe in these figures is that the baseline likelihood of many of these differences is pretty high—greater than 50%—regardless of respondents’ partisan identity. We can interpret this one of two ways. In one account, most people are doing these things, so we can focus on the fact that majorities of all parties are adopting or supporting pro-social behavior. In another, the one that we have been emphasizing, we draw attention to the partisan differences.

    Both of these observations are true, but to my way of thinking, the existence of this strong party divide is a distressing sign of what’s to come. And I hope it doesn’t take a severe COVID-19 outbreak to erase that divide.

    NOTE

    * Thanks to Ben Ho for the suggestion.
    ** So the title of this post is actually an unanswered question. It’s a waiting game right now.

  • Yes, Wearing a Mask is Partisan Now

    Anthony Fauci recently testified before the Senate about the COVID-19 crisis. If you were watching (I was not), you probably noticed that only some of those Senators present were wearing face masks.

    Twitter noticed:

    … as did the New York Times. Many have also remarked on President Trump’s refusal to wear masks, even when looking at masks in a place that makes masks. The message seems to be clear: wearing a mask is a partisan decision, even as a bare majority of Republicans report that they wish that Trump would wear a mask when he travels.

    Is that true outside of the Senate—do Americans’ decisions to wear masks depend on their partisan identity? As a continuing part my collaborative work on the politics of COVID-19 in the United States with Shana Gadarian and Sara Goodman, we recently asked a random, representative sample of 2400 Americans if they are wearing masks in public. Here is what we found from logistic regressions that adjust for a full set of dummies for age, race, gender, marital status, income, education, urban-rural, and state fixed effects.

    Adjusting for those differences, Democrats are more than 20 percentage points more likely than Republicans to (75% versus 53%) to report wearing masks in public.

    We can look to explain what’s driving this result by allowing the estimate of partisanship to differ by respondent characteristics: level of education, family income, urban or rural,* or state-level results from the 2016 presidential election.**

    These results tell us a couple of things.

    1. Partisan differences between Democrats and Republicans are largest among the middle range of incomes. They are smaller and usually statistically insignificant at the highest and lowest income levels.
    2. Partisan differences between Democrats and Republicans are largest in urban areas. They are small and statistically insignificant in rural areas.
    3. Partisan differences between Democrats and Republicans can be found across education levels, except for among those respondents who have not completed a high school degree.
    4. Partisan differences can be found in Trump-supporting states as well as those who voted strongly for Clinton. However, mask-wearing levels are consistently lower across the board in states that voted strongly for Trump. (The five points plotted are the 10th, 25h, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of Trump’s 2-party vote share by state.)

    Whatever drives these differences, wearing a mask is partisan now.

    NOTES

    * For education, income, and urban/rural, we allow for nonlinear relationships between each level of each variable and partisanship.
    ** Here, we model state-level Trump vote share as a continuous variable, and estimate state-level random effects.