Category: Politics

  • Why Political Scientists Should Stop Worrying about Policy Relevance

    The sixth annual meeting of the Southeast Asia Research Group featured a fascinating roundtable on political science, Southeast Asia research, and the policy world. Taking advantage of the meeting’s location at Georgetown, our local hosts Diana Kim and Yuhki Tajima invited four speakers whose expertise ran from gender and violence to community driven development to U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific.*

    The discussion ranged widely across a number of interesting topics, but for our audience, the most engaging questions were these: what should we be teaching our students if we want to help them to get policy careers? And what should I be doing in grad school if I want a policy career?

    There is a view among many political scientists that academic political science—like other academic fields—is just too abstract and theoretical to be relevant. We heard something of that view from some speakers: your Assistant Secretary of State does not want to know the theory or the history of a problem such as China’s Belt-and-Road, s/he needs actionable advice on what to do going forward now that Mahathir is questioning Najib’s deals. And that advice needs to be in the form of a short memo, two pages max.

    But we also heard another view, that for many positions in the policy world, methodological expertise, area experience, and historical knowledge are essential. That is, you better know how to produce and consume quantitative evidence, how to make sense of the historical antecedents of contemporary political events, and how to appreciate the nuances of society, culture, and religion in parts of the world that are far from the U.S. These are not just (most of) the values of SEAREG, they are also generally the values that pointy-headed academic political scientists prioritize in their own work.

    I asked about this divergence between these two positions, and I found the answer to be clarifying. Our speakers distinguished between operations and strategy. I think this distinction can help us to make sense of the debates in political science about policy relevance.

    Strategy is about making big picture decisions about, say, U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia. It is about mapping national interests to short- and medium-term strategic choices.* This is policymaking that happens at fairly high levels of the U.S. government. It is also what the standard critiques of contemporary political science implicitly hold as the ideal for policy relevant. Research is relevant if and only if it crosses the desk or shapes the thinking of one of several dozen strategic decisionmakers. And it is true that these people are not responsible for caring about methods, history, grand theory, or the details. Their job is to make decisions.

    Operations, though, is just as much part of the policy world as is strategy. It certainly employs more people and directly affects more people’s lives around the world. This is research about how to make development programs work, how to game out scenarios such as the unexpected election outcome, how to gather information about social problems or political views, and so forth. Our presenters confirmed what I have learned from my own experience with this community, which is that it values precise quantitative analysis, historical context, and nuance. At the level of operations, the details matter.

    The skill set for operations is, to a first approximation, the skill set of a well-trained comparative politics or international relations PhD student.

    Where operations and strategy converge, interestingly, is on the question of written communication. The currency of the policymaker is the two-page memo, and this is equally true at the operations and at the strategy end of the spectrum. The two-page memo is generally not something that PhD students learn to write. And yet, every single social scientist I’ve ever met who works in the policy world reports that this is a skill that they had to develop early on in order to succeed.**

    I have long held that critics of academic political science may greatly underestimate just how relevant political science is because the implicit model is something like Henry Kissinger. This is, in essence, a fixation on strategy at the expense of operations, based on a very limited idea of what policy engagement might mean. And lest my point be misunderstood, this is not an argument in favor of qualitative research or traditional-style IR theory and against quantitative analysis or formal theory. Indeed, the following sentence was also uttered by someone speaking from the “strategy” perspective: “Nobody reads International Security.”***

    The primary takeaway message is this: the skill sets that political science PhD programs provide have real value in the policy world. Area, quantitative, and other “academic” kinds of expertise matter, just not in the way that earns you a profile in the Sunday New York Times. The trick is to also develop strong written communication skills, which in this case means clear and direct arguments focused on the big picture even if the details do matter.

    A secondary takeaway message, though, is that there are very few positions at the strategy level, and there is probably no academic training that specializes in putting people in them anyway. So maybe political scientists can stop worrying and learn to love their discipline.

    NOTE

    * It is not directly relevant, but it is nevertheless interesting to observe that, currently, the United States literally does not have a strategy for Southeast Asia.

    ** One might think that we should ask students to write two-page memos instead of research papers. But this is a recipe for lousy, hurried, and undersourced memos. The better plan would be for students to submit two-page memos after they have submitted their thirty-page research papers. The other way to nurture this skill is to blog—yes, even this dying medium still has its uses.

    *** This is of course an exaggeration, but the fact that it even makes sense to joke about it speaks volumes. The joke is that even the journal most designed to contribute to the policy world doesn’t.

  • #GE14: The Malaysian Tsunami in Figures

    Malaysia’s 14th General Elections saw the incumbent Barisan Nasional regime ousted from power in an election broadly described as a “Malaysian Tsunami.” This term recalls earlier descriptions of waves of anti-BN voting as a “Chinese tsunami” or a “Malay tsunami,” and makes the case that Malaysians off all ethnic backgrounds turned out to vote against the regime.

    The figures below tell the story of the Malaysian tsunami using electoral return data (see this previous post for a description). For the purposes of this analysis, I focus on peninsular Malaysia only. Not because Sabahans and Sarawakians are not Malaysians—they too contributed to the Malaysian tsunami by voting in unprecedented ways for non-BN parties—but because important differences in party competition between peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia make a unified analysis difficult (Sabah and Sarawak are regions of exception).

    The 2018 Malaysian tsunami is best described by comparing vote returns from GE13 (2013) and GE14. As I have argued previously (see here (PDF) and here (PDF)) ethnicity plays a central role in Malaysian electoral politics. First, we can compare the relationship between the ethnic composition of an electoral district and support for the BN candidate in 2013 versus 2018.

    We see here that there remains a strong correlation between district Malay population share and BN support… but that the overall baseline level of support for the BN has simply dropped all across the board. This suggests a broad rejection of the BN across districts.

    We can also look at the relative change in BN support from 2013 to 2018. The figure below compares the percentage change in BN support—that is, (BNSupport2013 – BNSupport2018) / BNSupport2013—to both 2013 BN support and 2018 Malay population per district.

    We see here that the BN suffered more of a percentage decline in vote share in places where it had previously done poorly, and in places that (statistically) had been unlikely to support BN parties (that is, non-Malay majority districts).

    Now, one thing to note is that not all Malay-majority districts are the same. Some Malaysian states, such as Kelantan in the northeast, have never been UMNO/BN strongholds. A multivariate analysis can allow us to account for how states differ, and to see if that affects our conclusions about the relationship between ethnicity and BN support. First we can look at the simple regression output:

    The coefficients on Malay population by district (2013 malays and 2018 malays) are remarkably similar. So too are many of the state fixed effects. Where we see the biggest differences between GE13 and GE14 is in the intercept: a dramatic decrease in baseline support for BN candidates. The next figure compares predicted levels of BN support across states from these two regression analyses.

    The patterns are very similar—just shifted to the left in 2018. Notable additional differences are Kedah and Selangor, which swung more sharply against the BN relative to other states. But it still remains the case that Johor is a relative BN stronghold, and Terengganu and Kelantan are not.

    One final issue is urbanization, which is a common argument about what drives BN support in Malaysia. It is sometimes viewed as an alternative to arguments about the ethnic basis of Malaysian electoral politics; this is a debate I discussed here and here in the context of GE13. Ng, Rangel, Vaithilingam, and Pillay (2015) argues that we should consider urbanization the prime mover of Malaysian politics in 2013. Using data that they kindly shared with me, I’m able to test if their own coding of districts as urban, suburban, or rural shapes our conclusions about ethnicity in 2018.

    To do this, I interacted the Malay population variable above with their district urbanization coding, and plotted predicted levels of BN support in 2013 and 2018 by urbanization and district Malay population share.

    Rural Malaysians continue to be more pro-BN than urban Malaysians in 2018. But it also remains the case that regardless of the level of urbanization, district Malay population is a prime driver of BN vote share. The difference simply is that the predicted level of BN support is lower, all across the board.

    These results present a quantitative overview of a Malaysian electorate that swung broadly against the BN: Malays and non-Malays, urban and rural, across the entire peninsula. A Malaysian tsunami indeed.