Category: Politics

  • How Does Burma Lie with Statistics?

    Today I (TP) attended a talk that you could not easily find in the U.S.: a presentation on Burma’s macroeconomy and how it works, by an economist at Macquarie University. Poor Burma has a horrible economy. But for me, the striking thing about any research on Burma is always how hard it is to find good information about the country, even for people who speak Burmese and who do research there. Today, the presentation highlighted the fact that Burma’s government produces national statistics that are obviously false.

    Now, it is common to complain about the statistics produced by all countries’ governments. But examples of out-and-out fabrication of national economic statistics are comparatively rare. In most cases, people who complain about fabricated economic data either (a) do not understand what the statistics mean, (b) don’t understand how the statistics are calculated, and or (c) disagree with the conclusions that the data suggest. To take one case, it is fairly common now for certain types of people to complain that someone in the U.S. government is cooking the core inflation data. The reasons are probably that they want there to be high inflation (so they can blame it on the president) and they don’t understand that inflation is not the same as loose monetary policy or high gas prices.

    In Burma, though, economic data are transparently false. For example, the Burmese government reports that Burma’s economy has grown by about 12% per year on average (in real terms) for the past decade. If that were true then Burma, not China, would be the world’s fastest growing economy. In reality, the economy has probably grown about 3% per year, which is OK for a rich country but extra bad for a poor country like Burma.

    The question that interests me is not why the Burmese government lies with statistics, but how it lies. When you think about it, it’s not hard at all to tell that the figures are false. Data on the components of GDP seem accurate, but there’s no way that a country that reports that 50% of its GDP is in agriculture and that it has no noticeable increase in energy use has been growing so rapidly for so long. But the problem is, since it’s not hard to figure this out, how could they be cooking the books?

    One possibility is that they are just making up numbers. It’s possible, but this raises the question (to me at least) of why bother fabricated data that everyone knows is fabricated. Remember, no one is fooled by the government’s figures. An interesting alternative is that it comes down to inflation rates. When you calculate GDP, you calculate it in nominal terms and then apply a correction to adjust for yearly inflation. If you are the Burmese government, though, you persistently underestimate inflation. They do this because inflation is a signal of some pretty rotten stuff going on in terms of the government using the printing presses to finance its own consumption. So you claim that inflation (which is hard to measure anyway) is a lot lower than it is. The consequence is that Burma has nominal GDP growth, but is unwilling to correct properly for price changes. That will mean that its official figures will dramatically overstate real GDP growth.

    Exchange rates are also interesting. The Burmese government officially says that you trade 6 kyat to the U.S. dollar (more or less). But in reality, the market says that the rate is around 900 kyat to the dollar. This means that when government-owned enterprises report their profits (much of which are in U.S. dollars for things like natural gas exports), they are only required to submit 6/900 = .67% (less than a penny on the dollar) of it to the government’s accounts. The rest can be used as slush money.

    If this all sounds pretty close to money laundering, it is. But it’s always more interesting to me to figure out how one launders money than simply to observe that it’s being laundered.

  • Two Paired Comparisons: Mubarak-Soeharto and Continental-ANA

    A lot of Southeast Asianists are watching current events in Egypt with some interest. Even nonexperts are weighing in with their opinions on the parallels between Egypt 2011 and Indonesia 1998. It’s amazing, I get on a plane in Chicago and Mubarak is in power, I get off a plane in Tokyo and he’s gone. We here at Indolaysia have been feeding our family for the past several years based on our understanding the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order, so we have some understanding of what is at stake.

    In our opinion, the parallels between Indonesia and Egypt are interesting but greatly exaggerated. Here is what the two cases share:

    • an old dictator who rose to power through the armed forces and who is probably somewhere around Reagan 1989 in the senility scale
    • a military-party-personalist (“triple threat”) authoritarian regime
    • their majority religion (Islam)

    Here is what the cases do not share, all of which is important:

    • an economic meltdown that (1) precedes the political crisis and (2) came on the heels of strong performance. Egyptian economic growth has been pretty good for some time; Indonesia’s from 1990-1997 had been spectacular, but from 97-98 the turnaround was abrupt and dramatic.
    • an acceptable status quo. This follows from the previous point. The whole system in Egypt is rotten. The whole system in Indonesia was rotten too, but calls for regime change came after the realization that it would not be easy to keep the system together, which many people (and yes, this means many ordinary Indonesians too) would have found quite satisfactory.
    • a united and sustained protest movement. Without taking away from the sacrifices made by the Pahlawan Reformasi at Trisakti and the mass protests in Jakarta and elsewhere, my sense is that what we are seeing in Egypt is of a different scale altogether. This is more like People’s Power in the Philippines. I could be wrong.
    • an external patron whose foreign aid comprises the life blood of the country’s elite power structure. Egypt has one (the US) and Indonesia did not. My understanding is that Madeleine Albright called Soeharto shortly before he resigned but she couldn’t have done much to hasten his decision; no threats of withholding aid would have had much leverage on him. If Mubarak isn’t already in exile now he’s going soon. When Soeharto resigned he got in a limo and headed back to his house, where he lived for another decade.
    • this final point isn’t easy to pin down but I think it’s probably important. There is no ethnic Chinese problem in Egypt. There is a Coptic Christian problem but that seems altogether different. The spasm of violence that eventually dislodged Soeharto from rule was articulated through rioting masses targeting a visible and economically dominant minority. I don’t see that happening in Egypt, although I do think it’s probably possible to expct some pretty nasty violence against the symbols of the Mubarak regime if things don’t move along quickly.

    The better comparison, to our way of thinking, is Mubarak-Marcos. But even that isn’t perfect.

    All of this isn’t to say that there aren’t some similarities that we should take into consideration. I’m proud to cite a longtime Indolaysia crony with a very smart editorial in the International Herald Tribune on the risk of mass violence if the army abides–he draws on Indonesia as a comparative case. He’s right and it’s a smart comparison. But I don’t see the endgame in terms of authoritarian collapse playing out similarly between Egypt and Indonesia. And yes, I am implying that the endgame hasn’t played out yet in Egypt.

    *******

    Our second comparison for today is a lot less serious. Heading back to Tokyo for another quick trip, I arranged to fly ANA instead of Continental. This was a much better idea. First, I learned something: Japanese people pronound ANA “Anna” instead of “Ay-En-Ay”. Second, the food is superior: no grit in my kale this time, although on the other side of the ledger there was no cheese course on ANA. Third, the service was waaaaay superior on ANA. Another interesting discovery was Japanese plum wine, which until today (or was it last night…jetlag has me all confused) I always avoided because I reckoned that it would be something like sloe gin, which as far as I am concerned is a poison. On the contrary, plum wine is quite tasty. Let’s hear it for Nanko Ume no Kodawari Umeshu provided by Oyama Yumekobo Hibiki no Sato.

    anameals