Category: Politics

  • Is Gestapu Impossible?

    Benedict Anderson has written a powerful essay that appears in the current edition of Asia-Pacific Journal entitled “Impunity and Reenactment: Reflections on the 1965 Massacre in Indonesia and its Legacy.” (I learned of it from Jeff Hadler, who just co-organized a wonderful conference that I really wanted to attend on Indonesia’s New Order and its Legacies.)

    Anderson’s essay makes a small but provocative point

    Army leaders, helped by advice and half-concealed support from both the Pentagon and the CIA – then reeling under heavy reverses in Vietnam – had long been looking for a justification for a mass destruction of the Party. Now the September 30th Movement and the murder of the six generals provided the opening they awaited. Almost immediately the army-controlled media started a lurid and successful campaign to convince the citizens that the Movement was simply a tool, manipulated behind the scenes by the Party. By no means was it an internal military mutiny. The communists were said to have been planning a vast extension of the murders to the civilian population all over the country. The army’s campaign began on October 3, when the bodies of three of the generals were exhumed from a dry well in a remote part of the Air Force’s Jakarta base. (They had not been killed at home, but kidnapped to this area and then shot dead). The media, using blurred and retouched photos of the bodies, claimed that the victims had had their eyes gouged out and their genitals sliced off by sex-crazed communist women. (Many years later, thanks to military carelessness, the post-mortems written up on October 3 by experienced forensic doctors, and directed personally to Suharto that same day, came to light. No missing eyeballs or genitals, just the lethal wounds caused by military guns.). In a move that would have pleased Goebbels, the Movement’s full name was deleted in favour of Gestapu (GErakan September TigA PUluh). No one noticed that the word order here is impossible in the Indonesian language, but is syntactically perfect in English. Very few Indonesian generals then had perfect English). On top of the hyperinflation, this cunning Big Lie propaganda had the desired effect: massive anti-communist hysteria.

    Here is the idea. To translate “September 30 Movement” into proper Indonesian, one would say Gerakan Tiga Puluh September rather than Gerakan September Tiga Puluh. The latter is very obviously ungrammatical to speakers of Indonesian. So much so that when I teach about the events of late 1965 I almost always say the words Gerakan Tiga Puluh September by accident. (I never even realized it until just now, and it’s always bothered me.)

    It takes a careful and critical student of language and Indonesian politics to notice something like this; that is Anderson for sure. The implications of his observation are clear to the reader: no Indonesian speaker would have thought to come up with the term “Gestapu,” and it takes a speaker of English—probably American English—to translate “The Movement of September 30” word by word into Indonesian to produce Gerakan September Tiga Puluh. (The other common abbreviation for the movement, G30S, is perfectly grammatical.) For Anderson, this is just one more piece of evidence that the US was implicated, somehow, in the massacres of 1965-66.

  • Malaysia 13th General Elections Preview (5)

    Now that Prime Minister Najib Razak has dissolved Parliament, Malaysia’s elections are coming soon. Right now the two coalitions are in the process of nominating candidates for each electoral district. This process probably has no exact parallel anywhere else in the world: two multiparty coalitions are choosing candidates and parties to compete in single member districts with plurality voting. This post is about the logic behind that process.

    The two coalitions are the Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat. Each has several component parties. As before, I am concentrating primarily on the Peninsula.

    Consider the perspective of BN component party like UMNO. As a member of the BN, UMNO wants the BN to win majority of seats in parliament. Yet conditional on winning, they wish UMNO to be as large as possible as part of the coalition. The problem is that electoral districts differ in the BN parties that they want to support. Ethnicity is obviously relevant: all else equal, we would expect that a majority Chinese district would prefer an MCA candidate to an UMNO candidate. The BN therefore stands to do better by nominating the MCA rather than UMNO, and UMNO has to balance its desire for one more seat with its interest in winning a majority of seats in total.

    The decision is also strategic. Imagine that BN ignores the Chinese vote and nominates an UMNO candidate in a majority Chinese district. PR has an even stronger incentive to nominate a DAP candidate (remember that the DAP is not a Chinese party, but its constituency is predominantly Chinese and it is understood to advocate on behalf of policies consistent with Chinese interests). DAP will have a clear advantage; knowing this, the BN become less likely to nominate UMNO even if UMNO is greedy. Therefore, UMNO-DAP matchups should be rare, because they are off the equilibrium path. And in fact, we observed precisely zero UMNO-DAP matchups in GE12.

    Figuring this out is actually pretty easy in the cases of Chinese versus Malay districts. It is much more difficult for Indian voters, who are almost never the majority in a district but whose party (MIC) has been an integral part of the BN coalition. So the BN need to get at least token electoral representation by MIC to keep the Indian vote across the peninsula. It is also more difficult when imaging the choices of the PR. An ethnically heterogeneous and relatively urbanized district outside of the north (where PKR has a historical base Penang and PAS in Kelantan) is hard to figure out, because it is hard to tell ex ante if the Islamist PAS, reformist PKR, or social democratic DAP has the best chance of victory. This is made even more difficult by the dynamic nature of party coalition building. By this I mean that PR parties believe that they need to prove themselves, so that (for example) if PAS can manage to win in a district in which it had not previously won, it might be able to “prove” to its opponents that it can govern, increasing its future expected vote share, and hence its political power. So a party like PAS might advocate for a chance to contest in a district where it would not traditionally contest, for dynamic concerns about what its popular constituency could become in the future.

    In all, the nomination process in Malaysia today illustrates the fundamentally strategic nature of electoral politics in multiethnic and multireligious societies. But it is made far more complex and strategic by the ethnic and religious bases of most parties.

    Earlier in the series: Preview (1) | Preview (2) | Preview (3) | Preview (4)