Category: Politics

  • Malaysia 13th General Elections Preview (5)

    Now that Prime Minister Najib Razak has dissolved Parliament, Malaysia’s elections are coming soon. Right now the two coalitions are in the process of nominating candidates for each electoral district. This process probably has no exact parallel anywhere else in the world: two multiparty coalitions are choosing candidates and parties to compete in single member districts with plurality voting. This post is about the logic behind that process.

    The two coalitions are the Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat. Each has several component parties. As before, I am concentrating primarily on the Peninsula.

    Consider the perspective of BN component party like UMNO. As a member of the BN, UMNO wants the BN to win majority of seats in parliament. Yet conditional on winning, they wish UMNO to be as large as possible as part of the coalition. The problem is that electoral districts differ in the BN parties that they want to support. Ethnicity is obviously relevant: all else equal, we would expect that a majority Chinese district would prefer an MCA candidate to an UMNO candidate. The BN therefore stands to do better by nominating the MCA rather than UMNO, and UMNO has to balance its desire for one more seat with its interest in winning a majority of seats in total.

    The decision is also strategic. Imagine that BN ignores the Chinese vote and nominates an UMNO candidate in a majority Chinese district. PR has an even stronger incentive to nominate a DAP candidate (remember that the DAP is not a Chinese party, but its constituency is predominantly Chinese and it is understood to advocate on behalf of policies consistent with Chinese interests). DAP will have a clear advantage; knowing this, the BN become less likely to nominate UMNO even if UMNO is greedy. Therefore, UMNO-DAP matchups should be rare, because they are off the equilibrium path. And in fact, we observed precisely zero UMNO-DAP matchups in GE12.

    Figuring this out is actually pretty easy in the cases of Chinese versus Malay districts. It is much more difficult for Indian voters, who are almost never the majority in a district but whose party (MIC) has been an integral part of the BN coalition. So the BN need to get at least token electoral representation by MIC to keep the Indian vote across the peninsula. It is also more difficult when imaging the choices of the PR. An ethnically heterogeneous and relatively urbanized district outside of the north (where PKR has a historical base Penang and PAS in Kelantan) is hard to figure out, because it is hard to tell ex ante if the Islamist PAS, reformist PKR, or social democratic DAP has the best chance of victory. This is made even more difficult by the dynamic nature of party coalition building. By this I mean that PR parties believe that they need to prove themselves, so that (for example) if PAS can manage to win in a district in which it had not previously won, it might be able to “prove” to its opponents that it can govern, increasing its future expected vote share, and hence its political power. So a party like PAS might advocate for a chance to contest in a district where it would not traditionally contest, for dynamic concerns about what its popular constituency could become in the future.

    In all, the nomination process in Malaysia today illustrates the fundamentally strategic nature of electoral politics in multiethnic and multireligious societies. But it is made far more complex and strategic by the ethnic and religious bases of most parties.

    Earlier in the series: Preview (1) | Preview (2) | Preview (3) | Preview (4)

  • Malaysia 13th General Elections Preview (4)

    In two previous posts on the upcoming elections in Malaysia, I’ve shown data from the previous elections in 2008. In both cases, I restricted my analysis to Peninsular Malaysia. Why?

    To answer this, take a look at the map.

    East and West Malaysia: The Peninsula and Malaysian Borneo

    About 60% of Malaysia is located in Borneo, but it has about 20% of the population. That means that population density differs pretty dramatically. The ethnic dynamics also differ strikingly: Sabah is 80% bumiputera, but only a small fraction of that is Malay; Sarawak is 72% bumiputera, but only 23% Malay. The histories of Sabah and Sarawak are distinct from the Peninsula too. In fact, Malaysia was only formed when Sabah (formerly British North Borneo) and Sarawak (formerly the domain of the Brooke family) joined Malaya (along with Singapore for a short time). Never before had these territories been ruled together; historically, Malaya was associated with the Sultanate of Malacca, and Sabah and Sarawak with Brunei and Sulu.

    As a consequence of all of this, party politics doesn’t work the same way. UMNO and MCA have branches in Sabah but not Sarawak—at least, not that I’m aware of, and Chinese politics both in and out of the BN often takes place in other parties that are predominantly but not exclusively Chinese (like the SUPP or the Sabah Progressive Party). Opposition politics also doesn’t work the same way, for many bumiputeras are not Muslims, meaning that PAS does not have the same constituency there.

    All in all, you can’t look at party competition in the same way in these two states using the same lens. But these states are currently big BN strongholds, and looking forward, UMNO needs Sabah and Sarawak to retain power. The fact that these states are different does not mean that they are unimportant—just different.

    One key issue is the BN’s longstanding policy of favoring bumiputera interests through the New Economic Policy and its successors. Because UMNO dominates the BN, and UMNO is Malay party at heart (despite being open to all bumiputeras), it is widely believed that non-Malay and non-Muslim bumiputeras don’t effectively benefit in the same way that Malays do. Watch this space for further discussion. UPDATE: See the New Mandala GE13 series post with Patau Rubis of Sarawak for more.

    Earlier in the series: Preview (1) | Preview (2) | Preview (3)