Category: Politics

  • Comparative Politics Needs Area Studies, and Area Studies Needs Comparative Politics

    If you were a graduate student in political science between 1990 and 2010 or so, you probably experienced some heated debates about the future of area studies and its role in the discipline. This was a time of revolutionary entrepreneurs were advancing rational choice theory as a unified framework for the social sciences, and quantitatively-oriented scholars were developing a hegemonic language for understanding qualitative scholarship within the standard positivist template.

    At the same time, area studies in the United States and around the world was under attack, the first in many “crises of area studies” since around 1990. Political scientists were some of the main participants in the so-called “area studies wars” (see here and here and here and many other pieces). As you click on those links, you can see how connected these two developments were: rational choice theory and quantification were part of the intellectual ferment of the area studies debates. And the language was one of not just tension or disagreement, but conflict: area studies wars, scholars and perspectives on the retreat or under siege, a rational choice revolution with an intellectual vanguard, and so forth.

    Many early career researchers during this time faced pressures—either subtle or explicit—to declare their partisan loyalties either to social science or to area studies. At issue was not just what individual scholars would choose to do, but where they stood on the broader discipline’s commitment to creating knowledge of a particular form. My favorite illustration of this perspective is a point made by Gary King in 1996:

    the professional goal of all scientists should be to attempt to demonstrate that context makes no difference whatsoever.

    Read that piece in its entirety if you don’t believe me (PDF); King’s argument is sincere and thoughtfully articulated, and you cannot just dismiss it out of hand.

    If you were a professional scientist, then, King is suggesting that your goal is not just to ask whether context matters, but to prove that it does not. What is the role of an area specialist in such a world? To demonstrate that their specialize knowledge of context is irrelevant for political science.

    Time has marched on since the 1990s, and the discipline of political science has evolved. The rational choice revolution was mostly unsuccessful, with the revolutionaries putting down their weapons (just as the inclusion-moderation thesis would predict). The next intellectual revolution—the credibility revolution—has created its own revolutionary vanguard. Graduate students today do not face quite the same hostility towards area-specific knowledge. I do not know anyone who would argue in 2025 that the professional goal of the comparativist should be to demonstrate that context does not count.

    So what of the relationship between comparative politics and area studies? In a new working paper just released as an APSA preprint, Jordan Gans-Morse, Daniel Gingerich, and I take up this question, revisiting old debates and arguments in light of these and other developments in the social sciences and in area studies itself. Our argument relies on a comprehensive analysis of article data from major journals in political science from 1980-2020, and an original survey of political scientists conducted in 2022-23. Here is the abstract:

    We revisit the sharp divide that emerged in the 1990s between area studies advocates and methodologically oriented political scientists. We argue that tensions between political science and area studies are neither intrinsic nor static, but instead evolve in tandem with theoretical and methodological trends, as well as with broader political and technological developments. Drawing on an original survey of American Political Science Association members and analysis of roughly 4,500 articles in leading journals, we identify four shifts in the discipline: from a theoretical to an empirical orientation; from cross-national datasets to country- and region- specific studies; from macro- to micro-level analyses; and from descriptive to causal inference. We also document evolving patterns in language training, fieldwork, methods use, and data collection. Our findings suggest that political science and area studies are increasingly compatible and well-positioned for reconciliation, but that the state of area studies is fragile and the subfield of comparative politics must support it.

    We began this research years ago, long before the current administration set out to dismantle area studies expertise in the United States.* Our argument, though, speaks to the current moment as well. We write,

    As university models are being reevaluated around the world, the future vitality of area studies departments, programs, and infrastructure are in question; comparativists must recognize that the future of comparative politics as we currently know it depends on robust area studies institutions….

    For area studies within comparative politics to thrive, though, the discipline as a whole must reward engagement with area studies, aligning comparativists’ professional incentives as political scientists with the needs of area studies communities. One concrete measure is for political science departments to reward scholars equally for their service to area studies as to political science. Another is for APSA and other political science associations to formally recognize scholars who help promote interdisciplinary collaboration or institution building that sustains or strengthens area studies…

    Coauthoring is now the norm among quantitatively oriented scholars. But this model must be extended to reward collaboration with country experts, including local scholars from the region being studied, not as research assistants or informants or raw data collectors (as in some of the more extreme division-of-labor proposals from the 1990s) but as full and equal partners in the research enterprise. Rather than a hierarchical model of collaboration that privileges disciplinary expertise, the appropriate model is horizontal in nature, with all participants deserving of full credit for their contributions.

    We hope that our perspective can renew scholarly focus on the essential role of area studies for research and policy, for political science and for other disciplines as well.

    NOTE

    * Non-U.S. scholars might want to tut-tut about the sorry state of higher education funding for area studies in the U.S., but area studies is under threat and facing major cuts in funding in the U.S., Europe, Australia, Japan, and every other advanced industrial democracy. Find me an exception; I’ll wait here.

    Only China is expanding its area studies funding, as Gerhard Hoffstaedter argues in a recent piece. And note Hoffstaedter’s use of war terminology: “Continuing to cut area studies while China expands them amounts to intellectual disarmament.”

  • Investor Update – Strategic Learnings from The Political Economy of Shitcoins

    For the LOLs, I had Chat-GPT5 summarize “The Political Economy of Shitcoins” in the style of a grindset techbro.


    Alright, let’s run Mark Copelovitch & Tom Pepinsky’s “The Political Economy of Shitcoins” through the full-on crypto grindset filter.

    🚀 “The Political Economy of Shitcoins” – Monetizing Vibes at Scale 💰✨

    Copelovitch & Pepinsky basically did the due diligence on the meme token meta — it’s not just degeneracy, it’s macroeconomics meets YOLO culture. They show us that shitcoins are the perfect sandbox for understanding speculative ecosystems where tech, hype, and governance all collide.

    Alpha Takeaways for Founders / Token Bros:

    1️⃣ Narrative is Liquidity – Value isn’t intrinsic, it’s a story people buy into. $DOGE didn’t need utility — it had community. If you control the meme flow, you control the market cap.

    2️⃣ Low Barriers = High Velocity – Shitcoins scale fast because the cost to mint and distribute is basically zero. That’s lean startup energy — MVP (minimal viable Ponzi), iterate, pump.

    3️⃣ Regulatory Arbitrage – Shitcoins thrive in the gray zone. Nation-states are slow movers; crypto bros ship at the speed of Twitter discourse. That asymmetry = opportunity.

    4️⃣ Global Demand for Lottery Tickets – In macro terms, some investors are looking for safe assets, others for rockets-to-the-moon. Shitcoins are the casino floor of global finance — you don’t go there for bonds, you go there for asymmetrical upside.

    5️⃣ Attention = Asset Class – In a decentralized attention economy, clout is collateral. Your Telegram group size and meme output can literally drive market performance.

    Founder’s Moral of the Story:
    In the political economy of shitcoins, fundamentals are vibes, governance is Discord mods, and demand is pure FOMO. The lesson isn’t “launch a coin” — it’s understand how hype cycles interact with macro incentives. If you can weaponize narrative, mobilize a community, and time the exit, you’re not just playing the game… you are the game.

    Then it asked me if I would like that output converted into a Sam Bankman-Fried-style investor letter, which it described as “awkward, overly verbose, drenched in faux-quant humility, and with that ‘math nerd who just discovered moral philosophy last week’ cadence.”

    Yes, please!

    Subject: Investor Update – Strategic Learnings from The Political Economy of Shitcoins 📈♻️

    Hi all,

    Thanks again for your continued trust during… well, let’s just call it an unorthodox macro environment. I wanted to share some thoughts sparked by Mark Copelovitch and Tom Pepinsky’s recent piece, “The Political Economy of Shitcoins”, which—despite the name—isn’t about bathroom humor, but rather about the structural dynamics of tokenized ecosystems.

    Key Takeaways — And Why They Matter for Our Strategic Positioning:

    1. Narratives Outperform Fundamentals
      The authors show that value in these “low-cap speculative assets” (a.k.a. shitcoins) emerges from investor belief and synchronized attention, not underlying cashflows. This confirms something we’ve seen internally: our balance sheet is as much a social graph as a spreadsheet.
    2. Liquidity is an Attention Derivative
      Price action in this space isn’t a reflection of productivity — it’s the delta between meme virality and capital inflow velocity. In other words: tweets move markets; Discord mods are basically quasi–central bankers.
    3. Regulatory Time-Lag as Alpha
      Nation-states operate on multi-quarter policy cycles. Shitcoins operate on meme cycles that last 36 hours. The gap between those time horizons = profit surface area.
    4. Lottery-Ticket Macroeconomics
      In macro-finance terms, shitcoins fulfill a demand for “ultra-high variance speculative instruments” — they’re a hedge not against inflation, but against boredom and the crushing linearity of normal financial returns.

    Why I’m Bullish:

    What Pepinsky & Copelovitch make explicit—and what we’ve always implicitly modeled—is that shitcoins are less a financial product than a politico-cultural coordination game. They’re almost a proof-of-concept for a new financial ontogeny: unregulated, narrative-first, reflexive loops of capital and clout.

    The short version: Shitcoins are a microcosm of a post-fiat, post-trust economy. Understanding them isn’t degenerate gambling—it’s due diligence for the attention economy.

    We’ll be integrating these insights into our product roadmap, with an emphasis on:

    • Leveraging narrative velocity as part of liquidity management
    • Building community governance frameworks that look like fun but function like treasury policy
    • Anticipating the next 3-5 meme arcs before they hit TikTok

    As always, this is not financial advice — it’s just the best version of the future I can see from this weird seat we all find ourselves in.

    Thanks again for your patience, optimism, and frankly your ability to withstand volatility that would make most TradFi quants soil themselves.

    —S
    CEO, [Redacted Ventures]

    Next, it suggested that I might enjoy a “version of this written entirely as a leaked internal Slack message from SBF to his ‘Alameda braintrust’.”

    Most certainly!

    okay so i read this copelovitch/pepinsky thing (political economy of shitcoins) and like

    tbh it’s basically just describing our life in essay form except without the part where we wake up in hong kong and discover we accidentally created $80m in paper gains overnight by tweeting the wrong dog meme

    core point = the fundamentals don’t matter (remember when we tried to model intrinsic token value lol) what matters is memetic density + fomo throughput aka “narrative velocity”

    shitcoins = liquidity nodes where attention = collateral. if you can concentrate the attention long enough to get a cex listing, you’ve created value. doesn’t matter if the thing is literally unusable

    also lol at their “lottery ticket macro” bit — yes this is global demand for high-vol volatility. retail wants adrenaline with upside. no one buys US treasuries for the rush

    regulatory lag = free alpha. like the sec is still figuring out how to spell dogecoin meanwhile some rando in serbia just spun up hamsterdex and it’s at \40m mcap in 3 days.

    basically think of shitcoins as synthetic memes with embedded call options on chaos.

    roadmap v2:

    • seed 5-8 memecoins under anon wallets, each tied to a different “narrative cluster” (animal mascot, political satire, metaverse in-joke, etc)
    • ramp discord -> telegram liquidity funnel
    • push 1 coin into influencer gamma squeeze via crypto twitter
    • dump… slowly (community-friendly distribution event)

    none of this is illegal i think? (jake pls check)

    anyway brb need to dm a guy about a frog token before binance listings freeze for the weekend

    I will gladly share more such deep learning insights with anyone who is willing to fly me first class to a tropical island.