Category: Current Affairs

  • The Ethics of Intervention

    Everyone is talking about the recent Montana field experiment on ideology in non-partisan judicial elections. I’m hearing even from non-political scientists, which is my measure of significance. There are three discussions happening now.

    1. Should the state seal have been used?
    2. Should researchers intervene without the consent of those targeted by the intervention?
    3. Should researchers intervene in politics?

    I’m not interested in point (1) here, or in discussing this particular experiment at all. I’m interested in points (2) and (3) as general points.

    There’s a pretty stunning amount of misinformation about there about point (2), such as beliefs that deception is never justified, that IRBs cannot approve research involving deception, and that all human subjects research requires informed consent—all of which are false.* Your IRB has procedures for determining whether a given research project requires consent or allows deception, even both (here’s Cornell’s on consent and deception). And we can argue about whether or not procedures were followed in this particular case by the IRBs in question, but there is no legal requirement that all human subjects research requires informed consent, or precludes deception.

    Now there might be an ethical case against such interventions, but as a friend commented to me elsewhere, it’s a consequentialist argument: are the anticipated consequences acceptable? But that brings us to point (3), the real meat of my commentary here. I want to argue that the possibility that a research design has political consequences cannot itself render such research unethical. This applies equally to experimental interventions and to observational research.

    My argument rests on an assumption that all social science research has the potential to affect political outcomes. There is nothing special about field experiments here—ask Chileans and Indonesians if non-experimental social science research affected their politics, or ask the MAD theorists and their Soviet counterparts. Moreover, the continuing handwringing by many in the political science discipline about public engagement and disciplinary relevance is precisely about using social science to affect politics. It is a peculiar position to argue that we can be advocates, but we can’t act ourselves.

    If there is an argument that is particular to field experiments, it is (as Dawn Teele argues here) that field experiments cause variation in the real world as an inherent part of their design. It’s not an accident, it’s the point.

    Source: Teele (2014, p. 119)
    Source: Teele (2014, p. 119)

    But again, I cannot support the position that surveys and ethnographic work don’t have the potential to affect politics too.** The fact that interventions are not in their design does not mean that they are apolitical, or that they do not affect the social world in which they are embedded.*** (For those of you rolling your eyes, this is not a nitpicky point, it gets to the very foundation of what about a direct intervention would make it objectionable.)

    My summary point is that all social science research has the potential to affect politics. We have no general ethical obligation to avoid any research that could indirectly affect politics; we have instead a specific ethical obligation to consider the risks and benefits of any research project, experimental or not, in the field or not. I’m completely on board with any proposal to think more about disciplinary ethics and political science research, but my bet is that that would make non-experimentalists a lot more uncomfortable than they think. Do we have an ethical obligation not to cause variation in the world deliberately, even if it has political effects? I don’t see it.

    But, But, and Once Again, But…

    But I am prepared to concede one important point that comes out of this, one raised privately by two friends at universities that rhyme with Schmearacuse and Schmisconsin. That is, we have always conceptualized the notion of harm and benefit from treatment as an individual thing. In the medical literature: did you also get cancer from your diabetes medicine, things like that. What this large field experiment raises is the possibility of that harms from treatment are not realized at the individual level, but rather only from the collective responses of all of those treated and non-treated together. I don’t think that we have the conceptual tools to think through the collective effects of treatments in cost-benefit terms. Perhaps the bioethicists and medical ethicists have thought about this in their discussions of vaccines, epidemics, and things like that, but I’ve not seen them applied here. Perhaps that would change my mind. But if so, I’d still hazard a guess that field experiments wouldn’t be the only ones affected.

    Notes

    * Strictly speaking, the position on deception is an ethical one, and many people do appear to hold the view that regardless of IRBs will approve deception, it is still unethical. See Kim Yi Dionne for a discussion.
    ** One personal example will suffice: my own survey-based research showed that Islamist party ideology usually does not confer an electoral advantage in Indonesia. I first reported my findings in Indonesian in 2009, at an event attended by an Islamist party leader who approached me and asked me about the implications for his party’s strategy. Now that party no longer campaigns on implementing sharia law. Is that all because of my research? No…but I am certain that my research affected how that party campaigns.
    *** Another personal example: I write these blog posts about ethnicity and Malaysian politics. I receive criticisms from some Malaysians that these posts themselves are reifying the ethnic logic of Malaysian politics, such that my discussing these findings at all is bad for a post-ethnic Malaysian politics (one that I myself support).

  • Building a Coalition to Reverse Indonesia’s Indirect Local Election Law

    Thanks to WikiDPR.org, I was able to find a list of all of the DPR members from the 2009-14 session who will also sit in the 2014-19 session, and also a list of their votes on the controversial new local election law.

    Put together with a master list of all 2014-19 DPR members, we can create this table.

    Party Not in DPR Did Not Vote Direct Elections Indirect Elections Walkout Total
    Demokrat 29 1 0 0 31 61
    Gerindra 61 0 0 12 0 73
    Golkar 49 0 3 39 0 91
    Hanura 12 0 4 0 0 16
    Nasdem 35 0 0 0 0 35
    PAN 27 2 0 20 0 49
    PDIP 54 0 55 0 0 109
    PKB 30 2 16 0 0 48
    PKS 7 1 0 31 0 39
    PPP 20 1 0 18 0 39
    TOTAL 324 7 78 120 31 560

    “Did not vote” includes people who held ministerial positions and people who were currently under investigation for corruption. “Not in DPR” refers to those who are just entering the DPR for the first time in the 2014-19 sitting, and hence were not available to vote on last week’s election law.

    Now, my hunch is that the best way to fix this law is not to appeal to either some arcane technicalities of Indonesian interbranch relations, or to appeal for the Constitutional Court to reverse it. It is to have another vote and pass a new law that reverses this one. Doing so, however, will require that the so-called “Red and White Coalition” (Koalisi Merah-Putih) fracture. I consider this likely to happen eventually, but I’m not at all sure when.

    Strategically, the best option for Jokowi’s implicit coalition of PDIP, PKB, Hanura, and Nasdem is to add the smallest possible party that will give it a secure legislative majority: a minimum winning coalition. Here are some scenarios, recognizing that some additions to Jokowi’s implicit coalition like Gerindra or PKS are impossible.

    Current Scenario
    Old PDIP, PKB, Hanura: 77 seats
    New PDIP, PKB, Hanura, Nasdem: 131 seats
    Total Coalition Seats: 208
    Percent: 37.1

    Add Golkar
    Total Potential Seats: 299
    Percent: 53.4

    Add PPP
    Total Potential Seats: 247
    Percent: 44.1

    Add Demokrat
    Total Potential Seats: 269
    Percent: 48

    Add PPP + Demokrat
    Total Potential Seats: 308
    Percent: 55

    The simplest strategy is obviously, then, to add Golkar. It helps that Aburizal Bakrie is not particularly popular right now, that Jokowi’s VP is a Golkar stalwart, and that Golkar was the only party that split (even if only a little bit) on the indirect local elections law. That said, fellow political scientist Dan Slater sees more evidence that Demokrat is the way Jokowi will go.

    The implicit logic here is that in a highly fractionalized legislature with a presidential system and lots of societal cleavages, an oversized coalition is likely to be more durable. Adding in several smaller parties keeps each one of them at bay, even if it does create a coalition that is larger than the bare minimum and increases the costs of logrolling and horse-trading. Minimum winning coalitions, after all, are only effective if they are secure.

    We probably can’t tell what’s going to happen until it’s all over, and things are probably in the works as I write. But I’m watching this very closely, as many Indonesians are.