Tom Pepinsky

Category: Current Affairs

  • Elite Maneuvering, the Uighur Crisis, and Indonesian Politics

    Aaron Connelly recently tweeted about a sudden increase in attention to the Uighur crisis in Indonesia.

    The thread is worth reading in full, as it details the challenges that the current government’s predicaments in criticizing the Chinese government, and explains why Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim mass organization, has remained silent on the issue. The predicament comes from the fact that China supplies massive amounts of infrastructure investment that Indonesia’s president Joko Widodo needs, the fact that Indonesia has its own restive region which gives it a strong incentive to support non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and because ethnic Chinese Indonesians are a vulnerable population whose membership in the Indonesian political community has long been questioned. NU’s silence on the Uighur issue is plausibly linked to an explicit Chinese campaign to win over Indonesia’s Muslim elites, and Jokowi’s running mate for the upcoming elections is an NU elite. These facts constrain Jokowi’s options in responding to developments in Xinjiang.

    But Indonesia’s opposition is not so constrained. And here we have dilemma that’s inherent to democratic politics. Indonesia’s opposition is democratic, but large portions of it, including the frontrunner Prabowo Subianto, are illiberal (and even this is being generous). It is entirely reasonable for an opposition to lambast the country’s non-interference principle in the context of an incipient genocide (which is what the Uighur campaign is), but doing so empowers politicians who intentions are anything but liberal, tolerant, or inclusive. Indeed, we know from the Ahok affair that the opposition is keen to exploit anti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiments for political gain.

    As if on cue, here is a tweet from shortly after Connelly’s thread from the Prosperous Justice Party’s (PKS’s) parliamentary fraction—PKS is an Islamist party that is part of the opposition and that supports Prabowo’s 2019 presidential campaign.

    It says Indonesia must be serious in responding to the plight (or fate) of the Muslim Uighurs. This is a reasonable argument, and a liberal citizen concerned with global justice and human rights would have every reason to support it. But any elite endorsement of anti-Chinese mass opinion will inevitably rebound to affect the country’s Chinese minority, and we should have no illusions that a muscular campaign platform defending the Uighurs’ plight from Prabowo or PKS would actually affect their relations with China, or spill over positively to shape the state of affairs in Papua.

    But Connelly is entirely right that Indonesia’s opposition has the ability to make the Uighur crisis a political issue, one that shapes and is shaped by mass public opinion. We don’t know how that will play out in Indonesia, because no other Muslim democracy has confronted the Uighur crisis as an issue of mass politics. But we are about to see.

  • What Happens if Elections Are No Longer Legitimate?

    Two years ago, just a couple weeks before the 2016 presidential election, I asked what does it look like when citizens don’t trust elections?

    Perhaps more than anything that he has said through his campaign, Donald Trump’s charge that the upcoming presidential elections will be rigged have frightened political observers, and especially political scientists. The reason is that elite and public acceptance of electoral procedures is essential to democratic politics. Political scientists understand that the foundation of democratic political order is the acceptance of the rules of the game. The only way that we really know that losers accept those rules when they lose and respect the outcome. The politics of a losing presidential candidate rejecting the election itself is almost unimaginable. It would risk a crisis of systemic legitimacy.

    But what would such politics look like, now that we must imagine it? American history is no great source of information. There is the case of the Civil War, which began when southern states seceded from the union. But this was a cleavage first and foremost over policy—slavery—and the political order that it required. And as such, the Civil War had a clear regional divide over that policy. Trump’s allegations about vote-rigging are not regionally defined, and they are not about specific policy. They are channeling mass dissatisfaction with the entire political system, refracted (as is often the case with Trump) through the candidate’s own self-obsessions. No state could, or would, secede from the union over Trump’s electoral defeat. The crisis of systemic legitimacy would be national, within the states, between supporters of Trump and his opponents.

    The answers are not good, and I used the examples of Thailand and Madagascar to make my point. In the event, President Trump did not question the legitimacy of the 2016 election because he won it. But this morning, things have changed.

    It is now the official White House position that constitutionally-mandated recounts are illegitimate.

    In a month of harrowing news, this development is still almost incalculably bad for American democracy. I now assume that a substantial minority of Americans believe that the results of the elections in Florida, Georgia, Arizona, and California are democratically illegitimate unless the Republican candidate wins. Updating the lessons from the previous post,

    1. When electoral procedures lose popular legitimacy, it is nearly impossible to get that legitimacy back. Elections are one great way of building popular legitimacy, and if by assumption they no longer do, what will?
    2. Non-electoral sources of power are particularly dangerous when elections no longer legitimately empower politicians. It now falls to the very politicians who are involved in the recount to vouch for its legitimacy. The safest way to defend that legitimacy would be for the losing candidates to rebuke the President, directly and publicly. A public endorsement would be most meaningful if it were to come from, for example, DeSantis. Let us just ponder how likely that is.
    3. The downstream consequences from the loss of electoral legitimacy are nearly impossible to predict. I suspect that one consequence will be an ever-greater tolerance for executive malfeasance, on the logic that Congressional representatives and state governments lack democratic legitimacy.

    Caveats, as always, apply.

    Any number of Americans can tell you that they have never considered the current U.S. system to be legitimate. But even the strongest critics of electoral democracy must take seriously the gamble that they entertain when candidates like Trump undermine the legitimacy of U.S. elections. After all, look what happened when U.S. politicians tried to undermine the legitimacy of Obama’s presidency: Donald J. Trump became the GOP nominee.